Introduction
============

In everyday life, interactive as well as individual decision problems very rarely repeat themselves identically over time; rather, the experience on which most human learning is based comes from the continuous encounter of different instances of different decision tasks.

The current paper proposes an experimental study in which subjects faced different instances of two interactive decision problems (games), making a step forward in the realism of the strategic situations simulated in the lab. Specifically, subjects played in sequence different completely mixed games[^1^](#fn1){ref-type="fn"}, each obtained by multiplying the payoffs of one of two *archetypal* games for a randomly drawn constant. In each sequence, the perturbed payoff games of the two types were randomly shuffled. Thus, at each trial, subjects' task was twofold: recognize the type of the current game and act in accordance to this categorization.

In spite of its evident economic relevance, the topic of human interactive learning in mutating strategic settings has not received until now much attention, from both an experimental and modeling perspective.

One important stream of literature on this topic includes studies in which the experimental design is recognizably divided into two parts, according to which the repeated play of a stage game is followed by the repeated play of another one. The main goal of these studies is that of assessing the effects of learning spillovers (or *transfer*) from the first to the second part of the experiment (as in Kagel, [@B22]; Knez and Camerer, [@B23]; Devetag, [@B7]), also conditional to different environmental and framing conditions (as in Cooper and Kagel, [@B3], [@B4]). In a different experimental paradigm, Rankin et al. ([@B28]) propose a design in which players faced sequences of similar but not identical stag-hunt games, and whose goal is that of evaluating the basins of attractions of the risk- and payoff-dominant strategies in the game space.

Our experimental design distinguishes from those illustrated above for two key features. First, subjects played different instances of two different games, and, second, the instances of the two games occurred in random order, thus without inducing any evident partition in the experiment structure; at the beginning of our experiments, subjects were only told that they would have faced a sequence of interactive decision problems.

From the modeling perspective, a similarity-based decision process was for the first time formalized in the "Case-Based Decision Theory" (Gilboa and Schmeidler, [@B16]), according to which decisions are made based on the consequences from actions taken in similar past situations. Besides, the case-based approach was for the first time applied to game theory with the "fictitious play by cases" model proposed by LiCalzi ([@B24]). This model addresses the situation in which players play sequentially different games, and the play in the current game is only affected by experiences with past similar games. In this vein, Sgroi and Zizzo ([@B31], [@B32]) explore neural networks' capability of learning game-playing rules and of generalizing them to never previously encountered games. The authors show that back-propagations neural network can learn to play Nash pure strategies, and use these skills when facing new games with a success rate close to that observed in experiments with human subjects.

The contribution by Marchiori and Warglien ([@B25]) has shown that, in repeatedly played completely mixed games, reinforcement learning models have limited predictive power, and that the best predictors, i.e., a fictitious play model and a neural network fed back by a measure of regret, have substantially the same accuracy. The current paper extends this research and shows that the added value of modeling learning by means of neural networks is that of capturing subjects' sensitivity to dynamic changes in the payoff structure. Specifically, we introduce a variant of the zero-parameter Perceptron-Based (PB0) model, which we call SOFTMAX-PB0, test these two neural network models on the data from our multigame experiments, and compare their performance with that of other established learning models and Nash equilibrium.

The Multigame Experiments {#s1}
=========================

The current paper proposes two multigame experiments, whose goal is that of improving our understanding of the processes of categorization in games. Eight groups of eight subjects each participated in the experiments, and each group played a different sequence of 120 games (see Table [A3](#TA3){ref-type="table"} in Appendix). Within each group, half of the subjects were assigned the role of row player and the others that of column player; at each round, subjects assigned to different roles were randomly and anonymously paired. At the end of each round, subjects were provided with feedback about their and their opponents' actions and payoffs.

The experimental design is summarized in Table [1](#T1){ref-type="table"}.

###### 

**The two pairs of completely mixed *archetypal* games used for building the game sequences in the two experiments**.

                 Archetypal games                                                                                                 
  -------------- ------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------ ------- ---------- ------- --------
  Experiment 1   Player 2                                   *L*                                        *R*     Player 2   *L*     *R*
                 Player 1                                                                                      Player 1           
                 *U*                                        17, 5                                      16, 6   *U*        5, 17   2, 20
                 *D*                                        8, 14                                      17, 5   *D*        4, 18   11, 11
                 Nash Eq.: *P*(*U*) = 0.9, *P*(*L*) = 0.1   Nash Eq.: *P*(*U*) = 0.7, *P*(*L*) = 0.9                              
                 **Game A**                                 **Game C**                                                            
                                                                                                                                  
  Experiment 2   Player 2                                   *L*                                        *R*     Player 2   *L*     *R*
                 Player 1                                                                                      Player 1           
                 *U*                                        17, 5                                      16, 6   *U*        17, 5   15, 7
                 *D*                                        8, 14                                      17, 5   *D*        15, 7   18, 4
                 Nash Eq.: *P*(*U*) = 0.9, *P*(*L*) = 0.1   Nash Eq.: *P*(*U*) = 0.6, *P*(*L*) = 0.6                              

Experiment 1
------------

Four groups of subjects played four game sequences built starting from two 2 × 2 constant-sum games (henceforth game A and game B; see Table [1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). Game A and B payoffs were chosen in such a way that equilibrium probabilities for one player were not so different \[respectively, *P*(*U*) = 0.9 and 0.7\], whereas the other player was supposed to reverse his/her strategy \[respectively, *P*(*L*) = 0.1 and 0.9\]. Moreover, to get a balanced experimental design, payoffs in each cell of the two games where chosen to sum up to the same constant.

To build each sequence, 60 "type A" games were obtained by multiplying game A's payoffs for 60 randomly drawn constants[^2^](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} (normally distributed with mean 10 and SD 4). The same procedure was used to obtain 60 "type B" games[^3^](#fn3){ref-type="fn"}. Type A and B games were then shuffled in such a way that in each block of 10 trials there were five type A and five type B games in random order. Thus, in each block of 10 trials subjects could face the same number of type A and type B games.

### Participants

Thirty-two students from the faculties of Economics, Law, and Sociology of the University of Trento (Italy) participated in Experiment 1. Subjects were paid based on their cumulated payoff in 12 randomly selected trials plus a show-up fee (see [Experimental Instructions](#s2){ref-type="sec"} in Appendix).

### Results

Figure [1](#F1){ref-type="fig"} reports the relative frequency of *U* and *L* choices in blocks of 10 trials, separately for type A and B games.

![**Observed proportions of *U* and *L* choices averaged over blocks of 10 trials, separately for type A and B games**.](fnins-05-00139-g001){#F1}

Observed behavior in type A games is not well approximated by Nash equilibrium. Row players play Nash mixture in the first two blocks \[for which *P*(*U*) = 0.89\], but the proportion of *U* choices eventually converges to 0.74. As for the column players, play starts close to random behavior in the first block and converges to 0.33, higher than the 0.1 predicted by Nash's theory.

The predictive power of Nash equilibrium in type B games is also rather poor. In equilibrium, row players are supposed to choose action *U* with probability 0.7, whereas observed play converges to the relative frequency of 0.9. Column players are predicted to choose action *L* 90% of the times, but the observed proportion converges, from the third block, to about 0.4.

Experiment 2
------------

Experiment 2 was identical to the previous one, except for the fact that games A and C were used to build the four sequences (see Table [1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). Game C was chosen in such a way that equilibrium probabilities were, for both players, close to equal chance; thus, no reversal of choice strategies was implied. Also in this case, in each cell of games A and B, payoffs sum up to the same constant.

### Participants

Thirty-two students from the faculties of Economics, Law, and Sociology of the University of Trento (Italy) participated in Experiment 2. Subjects were paid based on their cumulated payoff in 12 randomly selected trials plus a show-up fee (see [Experimental Instructions](#s2){ref-type="sec"} in Appendix).

### Results

Figure [2](#F2){ref-type="fig"} illustrates the results from Experiment 2. The relative frequency of *U* choices in type A games is systematically higher than that predicted by Nash's theory, similarly to what happened in Experiment 1. It is interesting to note that, in type C games, empirical behavior of both row and column players eventually converges to Nash play \[*P*(*U*) = *P*(*L*) = 0.6\], confirming that Nash equilibrium is a good predictor (at least in the long run) when predicted choice probabilities are close to 0.5 (Erev and Roth, [@B11]; Erev and Haruvy, in preparation).

![**Observed proportions of *U* and *L* choices averaged over blocks of 10 trials, separately for type A and C games**.](fnins-05-00139-g002){#F2}

### Cross-game learning

The question of how play in type A games is affected by the simultaneous play of games of a different kind can be easily answered by comparing choice frequencies in type A games in the two experiments. To this end, we ran a two-way, repeated measures analysis (results are summarized in A1 and A2 in Appendix), in which we tested the effects of the variables *Experiment* (i.e., the experimental condition) and *Time*, and of their interaction on choice frequencies for both row and column players. As a result, the variable Experiment has no significant effect, implying that no cross-game learning is taking place. We conclude that, when games of just two types are present, subjects are able to recognize the two strategic situations and act without confounding them.

The Model
=========

Since when McCulloch and Pitts ([@B26]) introduced the first neuronal model in 1943, artificial neural networks have usually been intended as mathematical devices for solving problems of classification and statistical pattern recognition (see for example, Hertz et al., [@B19]; Bishop, [@B1]). For this reason, neural network-based learning models are the most natural candidates for predicting data from our multigame experiments, wherein a categorization task is implicit.

We present here a variant of the PB0 model proposed in Marchiori and Warglien ([@B25]), which we call SOFTMAX-PB0. This model is a *simple perceptron*, i.e., a one-layer feed-forward neural network (Rosenblatt, [@B29]; Hopfield, [@B21]); its input units (labeled with in*~i~*) are as many as the game payoffs, whereas its output units (labeled with out*~j~*) are as many as the actions available to a player. Different from the PB0 model, according to SOFTMAX-PB0, the activation states of output units are determined via the *softmax* rule (1), and can thus be readily interpreted as choice probabilities.
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The term *w~ij~* in (1) is the weight of the connection from input unit in*~i~* to output unit out*~j~*.

Compared to the use of the *tanh* activation function, calculating activation states via the *softmax* rule avoids the premature saturation of output units, and in general results in a better fit of the data and has important theoretical implications[^4^](#fn4){ref-type="fn"}.

Adaptive learning from time step *t* − 1 to time step *t* occurs through modifications in the connection weights as follows:
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In the current model, the parameter λ that appears in (3) is replaced by a deterministic function, whose value at time step *t* is defined as the ratio between the experienced cumulated regret and the maximum cumulated regret. It is worth noting that the SOFTMAX-PB0 is non-parametric, as also in the *softmax* activation function (1) no free parameters are introduced.

In (3), targ*~j~* is the *ex*-*post* best response to the other players' actions, and it is equal to one if action *j* was the best response, and zero otherwise. Finally, the regret term is simply defined as the difference between the maximum obtainable payoff given other players' actions and the payoff actually received.

The SOFTMAX-PB0 and the PB0 models, behavior is the result of adjustments in the direction of the ex-post best response (*ex*-*post rationalizing* process), and these adjustments are proportional to a measure of regret, consistently with findings in the neuroscientific field (Coricelli et al., [@B5]; Daw et al., [@B6]).

The SOFTMAX-PB0 model, as well as the PB0 one, presents some architectural analogies with established models of learning in games, but it has also some peculiar features that differentiate it from its competitors, as illustrated in Figure [3](#F3){ref-type="fig"}. Established learning models have two main cyclic component processes: (1) behavior is generated by some *stochastic choice rule* that maps propensities into probabilities of play; (2) *Learning* employs feedback to modify propensities, which in turn affect subsequent choices.

![**Adapted from Marchiori and Warglien ([@B25]): General architecture of a "propensities and stochastic choice rule" learning model (left), and general architecture of the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model (right)**.](fnins-05-00139-g003){#F3}

The (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model's architecture is only partially similar to that of the other learning models. What distinguishes our models is the direct dependence of choice behavior upon game payoffs (represented in the "input layer"). Whereas in a typical economic learning model choice is a function of propensities only, here it is function of both propensities *and* the payoffs of the game.

This architecture provides the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model with a peculiar capability to discriminate among different games. Conventional learning models in economics are designed for repeated games. There is learning, but no discrimination or generalization: the simulated agent is unable to discriminate between different games at a certain moment; if given abruptly a different game, it would respond in the same way, or just throw away what it had previously learned. On the other hand, discrimination is something perceptrons do very well, and since the output is also directly affected by perceived inputs (the activation states of input units), a network, besides learning, will respond differently to different games.

The sampling paradigm for modeling learning
-------------------------------------------

Particularly relevant to the current analysis are the two contribution by Erev ([@B8]) and by Gonzalez and Dutt ([@B17]), in which the INERTIA SAMPLING AND WEIGHTING (I-SAW) and INSTANCE BASED LEARNING (IBL) models are proposed. According to these models, agents are supposed to make their decisions based on samples from their past experience. These models have been shown to capture important regularities of human behavior in decisions from experience (Erev et al., [@B10]; Gonzalez et al., [@B18]).

The most obvious way of modifying these models in order to perform conditional behavior is that of considering agents that draw from a subset of past experiences that are relevant to the current decision task. However, such an implementation would imply an exogenous intervention for the classification of the situation at hand, requiring an explicit theory of what is similar/relevant to what. On the other hand, the modeling approach based on sampling easily gives account for learning spillover effects (Marchiori et al., unpublished).

However, the classification operated by the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model is endogenous; agents just observe inputs and respond to them without any external intervention and the entire process of classification is implicit in the structure of the model itself.

Materials and Methods
=====================

Predicted choice frequencies were obtained by averaging results over 150 simulations, and, for parametric models, this procedure was repeated for each parameter configuration. Table [2](#T2){ref-type="table"} collects the description of the portions of the parameter spaces investigated.

###### 

**Explored portions of parameter spaces and the parameter configurations yielding the lowest average MSD in the two experiments**.

  Model   Portions of parameter spaces considered   Best fit parameters               
  ------- ----------------------------------------- --------------------------------- ----------------------
  NFP     λ in \[1.5, 4.0\] by = 0.25               *w* in \[0.1, 0.9\] by = 0.1      λ = 4.0, *w* = 0.7
  NRL     λ in \[3.0, 7.0\] by = 0.5                *w* in \[0.10, 0.90\] by = 0.05   λ = 5.5, *w* = 0.50
  RE      λ in \[2.2, 3.4\] by = 0.1                *N*(1) in \[27, 34\] by = 1       λ = 2.7, *N*(1) = 31
  RL      λ in \[6.0, 10.0\] by = 0.5               *w* in \[0.10, 0.90\] by = 0.05   λ = 10.0, *w* = 0.50
  SFP     λ in \[10.0, 14.0\] by = 0.5              *w* in \[0.05, 0.90\] by = 0.05   λ = 13.0, *w* = 0.75
  stEWA   λ in \[1, 9\] by = 0.1                                                      λ = 5.8

We tested models' predictive power by considering estimated choice frequencies corresponding to the parameter configurations that minimized the mean square deviation (henceforth MSD; Friedman, [@B15]; Selten, [@B30]) in our two experiments. Considering average MSD scores in the two experiments does not penalize directly the number of free parameters of a model; therefore, in this analysis, parametric models are advantaged over the non-parametric PB0 and SOFTMAX-PB0 ones.

In our comparative analysis, we considered the following learning models: normalized fictitious play (NFP; Erev et al., [@B13]); normalized reinforcement learning (NRL; Erev et al., [@B13]); Erev and Roth's reinforcement learning (REL; Erev and Roth, [@B11]); reinforcement learning (RL; Erev et al., [@B13]); stochastic fictitious play (Erev et al., [@B13]); and self-tuning experience weighted attraction (stEWA; Ho et al., [@B20]). Section ["Competitor Models and Investigated Portions of Parameter Spaces"](#s3){ref-type="sec"} in Appendix briefly reviews these models.

Simulation Results and Discussion
=================================

Although simple perceptrons suffer severe theoretical limitations in the discrimination tasks they can carry out (Minsky and Papert, [@B27]; Hertz et al., [@B19]), our simulation results show that they are nonetheless able to discriminate between two different strategic situations and predict well choice behavior observed in our multigame experiments. Simulation results are collected in Figure [4](#F4){ref-type="fig"} and, more in detail, in Tables [3](#T3){ref-type="table"} and [4](#T4){ref-type="table"}.

###### 

**Predicted and observed choice frequencies in Experiment 1**.

                MSD                Type A games   Type B games                                                                  
  ------------- ------- ---------- -------------- -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
  Empirical             *P*(*U*)   0.89           0.89           0.84   0.81   0.76   0.74   0.16   0.32   0.41   0.39   0.42   0.38
                        *P*(*L*)   0.53           0.40           0.26   0.26   0.26   0.26   0.74   0.78   0.85   0.86   0.91   0.91
  Nash          0.053   *P*(*U*)   0.90           0.90           0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.70   0.70   0.70   0.70   0.70   0.70
                        *P*(*L*)   0.10           0.10           0.10   0.10   0.10   0.10   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90
  NFP           0.081   *P*(*U*)   0.55           0.65           0.57   0.56   0.58   0.51   0.62   0.51   0.63   0.60   0.56   0.67
                        *P*(*L*)   0.59           0.50           0.60   0.54   0.64   0.55   0.64   0.65   0.60   0.70   0.57   0.62
  NRL           0.094   *P*(*U*)   0.59           0.40           0.68   0.65   0.64   0.64   0.58   0.43   0.68   0.66   0.64   0.64
                        *P*(*L*)   0.65           0.73           0.54   0.53   0.54   0.57   0.67   0.70   0.53   0.53   0.54   0.55
  PB0           0.024   *P*(*U*)   0.78           0.96           0.97   0.96   0.95   0.95   0.49   0.35   0.26   0.28   0.16   0.25
                        *P*(*L*)   0.77           0.68           0.47   0.38   0.35   0.33   0.71   0.80   0.85   0.86   0.93   0.87
  REL           0.076   *P*(*U*)   0.50           0.49           0.51   0.51   0.51   0.49   0.51   0.48   0.51   0.50   0.49   0.49
                        *P*(*L*)   0.50           0.50           0.50   0.49   0.50   0.49   0.50   0.50   0.51   0.50   0.49   0.49
  RL            0.097   *P*(*U*)   0.60           0.37           0.64   0.63   0.63   0.64   0.57   0.40   0.64   0.63   0.63   0.64
                        *P*(*L*)   0.60           0.70           0.47   0.49   0.51   0.57   0.62   0.67   0.47   0.49   0.51   0.55
  SFP           0.094   *P*(*U*)   0.57           0.53           0.67   0.59   0.51   0.50   0.63   0.50   0.48   0.42   0.60   0.60
                        *P*(*L*)   0.54           0.50           0.51   0.32   0.52   0.41   0.58   0.69   0.65   0.79   0.68   0.69
  SOFTMAX-PB0   0.018   *P*(*U*)   0.84           0.97           0.95   0.90   0.90   0.92   0.46   0.28   0.25   0.31   0.31   0.31
                        *P*(*L*)   0.76           0.56           0.32   0.39   0.51   0.46   0.72   0.82   0.87   0.83   0.89   0.82
  stEWA         0.086   *P*(*U*)   0.62           0.64           0.64   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.67   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.64
                        *P*(*L*)   0.72           0.75           0.75   0.75   0.75   0.75   0.74   0.75   0.75   0.75   0.75   0.75

*The second column from the left reports the MSD scores associated to each model. For parametric models, predicted frequencies have been obtained with the parameter configuration reported in the fourth column of Table [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}*.

###### 

**Predicted and observed choice frequencies in Experiment 2**.

                MSD                Type A games   Type C games                                                                  
  ------------- ------- ---------- -------------- -------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
  Empirical             *P*(*U*)   0.88           0.88           0.86   0.92   0.88   0.86   0.42   0.60   0.60   0.68   0.56   0.63
                        *P*(*L*)   0.51           0.43           0.44   0.43   0.33   0.42   0.78   0.75   0.82   0.70   0.63   0.60
  Nash          0.034   *P*(*U*)   0.90           0.90           0.90   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60
                        *P*(*L*)   0.10           0.10           0.10   0.10   0.10   0.10   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60   0.60
  NFP           0.036   *P*(*U*)   0.62           0.69           0.59   0.66   0.61   0.65   0.62   0.55   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.57
                        *P*(*L*)   0.50           0.50           0.57   0.50   0.56   0.51   0.57   0.51   0.46   0.54   0.50   0.52
  NRL           0.047   *P*(*U*)   0.72           0.92           0.87   0.58   0.56   0.70   0.76   0.85   0.86   0.61   0.55   0.70
                        *P*(*L*)   0.52           0.49           0.45   0.43   0.49   0.49   0.56   0.57   0.60   0.46   0.49   0.49
  PB0           0.029   *P*(*U*)   0.75           0.85           0.89   0.88   0.95   0.93   0.78   0.73   0.56   0.50   0.53   0.46
                        *P*(*L*)   0.57           0.55           0.55   0.51   0.61   0.70   0.54   0.45   0.52   0.56   0.57   0.57
  REL           0.055   *P*(*U*)   0.51           0.49           0.51   0.51   0.50   0.51   0.50   0.51   0.52   0.50   0.51   0.51
                        *P*(*L*)   0.50           0.50           0.49   0.50   0.51   0.49   0.50   0.51   0.50   0.50   0.49   0.49
  RL            0.053   *P*(*U*)   0.71           0.93           0.88   0.56   0.52   0.68   0.75   0.87   0.87   0.59   0.50   0.68
                        *P*(*L*)   0.53           0.49           0.47   0.41   0.52   0.52   0.55   0.59   0.59   0.44   0.52   0.52
  SFP           0.036   *P*(*U*)   0.62           0.71           0.59   0.61   0.60   0.70   0.59   0.50   0.59   0.60   0.63   0.40
                        *P*(*L*)   0.51           0.48           0.55   0.41   0.46   0.50   0.58   0.51   0.47   0.56   0.56   0.60
  SOFTMAX-PB0   0.028   *P*(*U*)   0.77           0.83           0.87   0.85   0.93   0.90   0.80   0.68   0.54   0.56   0.59   0.48
                        *P*(*L*)   0.56           0.61           0.55   0.49   0.60   0.70   0.52   0.46   0.53   0.61   0.56   0.58
  stEWA         0.058   *P*(*U*)   0.54           0.54           0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54   0.54
                        *P*(*L*)   0.61           0.63           0.64   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.61   0.63   0.64   0.64   0.64   0.64

*The second column from the left reports the MSD scores associated to each model. For parametric models, predicted frequencies have been obtained with the parameter configuration reported in the fourth column of Table [2](#T2){ref-type="table"}*.

![**Predicted and observed choice frequencies in Experiment 1 (top panels) and 2 (lower panels)**.](fnins-05-00139-g004){#F4}

Established learning models are not able to discriminate between the two different game structures, providing the same "average" behavior for both types of games (see Tables [3](#T3){ref-type="table"} and [4](#T4){ref-type="table"}), and are always outperformed by Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, the SOFTMAX-PB0 and PB0 models are able to replicate subjects' conditional behavior, due to the direct dependence of their response on game payoffs, remarkably outperforming Nash equilibrium and all the other models of learning considered in this analysis.

Comparison of the performance of the PB0 and SOFTMAX-PB0 models shows how the introduction of the *softmax* rule for calculating output units' activations improves the fit of the data.

Cross-game learning
-------------------

As reported at the end of Section ["The Multigame Experiments,"](#s1){ref-type="sec"} our experimental data do not provide evidence of cross-game learning. In regard to this, simulation results show that there is a partial qualitative parallelism between the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model's predictions and observed behavior. For example, for the row player, the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model provides very similar trajectories in the two experiments. However, if we consider column player's predicted behavior, the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model produces very different trajectories in the two experiments. This might imply that the (SOFTMAX-)PB0's structure is not complex enough to completely avoid spillover effects across games, although this aspect would deserve a more systematic investigation. However, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which learning spillovers do take place and this feature of the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model would turn out to be advantageous.

Conclusion
==========

The present paper presents an experimental design in which subjects faced a sequence of different interactive decision problems, making a step forward in the realism of the situations simulated in the lab. The problems in the sequences were different instances of two 2 × 2 completely mixed games. Thus, at each trial, subjects' task was twofold: recognize the type of the current decision problem, and then act according to this categorization. Our experimental results show that subjects are able to recognize the two different game structures in each sequence and play accordingly to this classification. Moreover, our experimental data do not provide evidence of cross-game learning, as there are no significant differences in the play of type A games in the two experiments.

Our experiments were designed with the precise goal of testing the discrimination capability of the PB0 and SOFTMAX-PB0 neural network models in comparison with that of other established models of learning proposed in the Psychology and Economics literature. Simulation results show that traditional "attraction and stochastic choice rule" learning models are not able to discriminate between the different strategic situations, providing a poor "average" behavior, and are always outperformed by Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, the (SOFTMAX-)PB0 model is able to replicate subjects' conditional behavior, due to the direct dependence of its response on game payoffs, and performs better than standard theory of equilibrium. This latter fact is particularly remarkable; in our experiments, the two classes of games were built based on their Nash equilibrium, so that the classification was induced by the different equilibrium predictions. On the contrary, our neural network models of adaptive learning were able to classify the different game structures without any external and predetermined partition of the game space.

We are well aware of the need for a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of categorization in games. Further experimental research could focus, for example, on sequences with more than two types of games, or on the effects of different degrees of payoff perturbations on learning spillovers.
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^1^Games with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

^2^Only positive values were considered.

^3^Thus type A and B games had, respectively, the same mixed strategy equilibrium of games A and B.

^4^Moreover, when outputs are calculated via (1), the updating rule (3) leads to Cross-Entropy minimization or, in other terms, to the maximization of the likelihood of observing a given training set.

Experimental Instructions {#s2}
=========================

Instructions
------------

You are participating in an experiment on interactive decision-making funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR). This experiment is not aimed at evaluating you neither academically nor personally, and the results will be published under strict anonymity.

You will be paid based on your performance, privately and in cash, according to the rules described below.

During the experiment, you will not be allowed to communicate with the other participants, neither verbally nor in any other way. If you have any problem or questions, raise your hand and a member of the staff will immediately contact you.

The experiment will consist of 120 rounds, and at each round you will face an interactive decision task. Specifically, at each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant and your payoff will depend on both your decision and that of the other participant. The structure of each decision task will be represented as shown in the following figure:

The other player (column player)

Action 1

Action 2

YOU (row player)

Action 1

(6, 4)

(4, 7)

Action 2

(3, 4)

(5, 6)

You have been assigned the role of "row player": therefore, the other player will *always* play the role of "column player."

For each player two actions are available (labeled "Action 1" and "Action 2"). For every possible combination of actions by row and column players, there corresponds a cell in the matrix. In every cell there are two numbers between parentheses: the first number corresponds to YOUR payoff (in experimental currency units), and the second corresponds to the payoff of the other player (again in experimental currency units).

As an example, referring to the matrix reported below, if YOU choose to play "Action 1" and the other player chooses to play "Action 2," then the payoffs will be four for YOU (row player) and seven for the other player (column player).

The other player (column player)

Action 1

Action 2

YOU (row player)

Action 1

(6, 4)

(4, 7)

Action 2

(3, 4)

(5, 6)

Please, remember that the experiment will consist of 120 rounds. At each round, you will be shown a sequence of two screenshots.

The first screenshot will show you the current payoff matrix, and you will be invited to make a decision. In order to make a decision, you must type either "1" or "2" in the box labeled "your decision," and then click on the button "confirm." Once you have clicked the confirmation button, you cannot change your decision. You will have a maximum of 30 s to choose: after those 30 s a blinking red message will appear on the right-up corner of the screen and spur you to make a decision. Delaying your decision will cause the other participants to wait for you.

Once all players have made their decision, the second screenshot will appear on your monitor. In this second screenshot there will be reported the action you chose, the action chosen by the other player, your respective payoffs, and the payoff matrix you saw in the first screenshot.

The second screenshot will be visible on your monitor for 10 s and then another round will start.

This process will be repeated for 120 times. After all rounds have been played, the experiment will be over and the procedure of payment will start. In order to determine your payment, 12 integers between 1 and 120 will be randomly drawn without replacement. In this way, 12 out of the 120 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be paid based on their outcomes. One experimental currency unit is equivalent to 10 eurocents (10 experimental units = 1 euro). Moreover, independently from your performance, you will be paid an additional show-up fee of 5 euro.

Before the beginning of the experiment, you will be asked to fill a questionnaire to verify whether the instructions have been understood. Then the experiment will start.

At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill a questionnaire for your payment.

Thank you for your kind cooperation!

Repeated measures ANOVA
=======================

Competitor models and investigated portions of parameter spaces {#s3}
===============================================================

The REL model (Erev et al., [@B9], [@B12])
------------------------------------------

### Attractions updating

The propensity of player *i* to play her *k*-th pure strategy at period *t* + 1 is given by:
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###### 

**Two-way, repeated measures ANOVA (row players)**.

               df   Sum Sq   Mean Sq   *F* value   Pr(\>*F*)
  ------------ ---- -------- --------- ----------- -----------
  Experiment   1    0.03     0.03      0.90        0.38
  Residuals    6    0.23     0.04                  

*We tested the model Proportion (*U*) ∼ Experiment \*Time + Error (between groups). The effect of the experimental condition is not significant*.

###### 

**Two-way, repeated measures ANOVA (Column players)**.

               df   Sum Sq   Mean Sq   *F* value   Pr(\>*F*)
  ------------ ---- -------- --------- ----------- -----------
  Experiment   1    0.11     0.11      1.07        0.34
  Residuals    6    0.61     0.10                  

*We tested the model Proportion (*L*) ∼ Experiment \*Time + Error (between groups). The effect of the experimental condition is not significant*.

###### 

**Two of the game sequences played in Experiment 1 and 2**.

  Profile:   Sequence 1 -- Experiment 1   Sequence 1 -- Experiment 2                                                                                
  ---------- ---------------------------- ---------------------------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----
  Game 1     190                          56                           179   67    89    156   190   56    93    27   87    32    43    76    93    27
  Game 2     58                           199                          23    235   47    211   129   129   120   35   113   42    56    99    120   35
  Game 3     152                          44                           143   53    71    125   152   44    166   49   156   58    78    137   166   49
  Game 4     74                           21                           70    26    35    61    74    21    125   37   111   51    111   51    133   29
  Game 5     235                          69                           221   83    110   194   235   69    156   46   147   55    73    128   156   46
  Game 6     33                           115                          13    135   27    121   74    74    186   54   175   65    87    153   186   54
  Game 7     135                          39                           127   47    63    111   135   39    91    26   80    37    80    37    96    21
  Game 8     72                           244                          28    288   57    259   158   158   106   31   93    43    93    43    112   25
  Game 9     34                           118                          13    139   27    125   76    76    163   48   144   67    144   67    173   38
  Game 10    42                           142                          16    168   33    151   92    92    148   43   131   61    131   61    157   34
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 11    52                           180                          21    211   42    190   116   116   162   47   142   66    142   66    171   38
  Game 12    170                          50                           160   60    80    140   170   50    170   50   160   60    80    140   170   50
  Game 13    51                           174                          20    205   41    185   113   113   105   30   92    43    92    43    111   24
  Game 14    53                           183                          21    215   43    194   118   118   195   57   184   69    92    161   195   57
  Game 15    124                          36                           117   44    58    102   124   36    212   62   199   74    99    174   212   62
  Game 16    62                           213                          25    250   50    225   137   137   188   55   177   66    88    155   188   55
  Game 17    232                          68                           218   81    109   191   232   68    141   41   124   58    124   58    149   33
  Game 18    64                           219                          25    258   51    232   141   141   74    21   65    30    65    30    78    17
  Game 19    218                          64                           205   77    102   180   218   64    298   87   263   122   263   122   315   70
  Game 20    192                          56                           181   68    90    158   192   56    183   54   172   64    86    151   183   54
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 21    60                           205                          24    242   48    217   133   133   173   51   153   71    153   71    183   40
  Game 22    100                          29                           94    35    47    82    100   29    95    27   83    39    83    39    100   22
  Game 23    49                           166                          19    196   39    176   107   107   106   31   100   37    50    87    106   31
  Game 24    148                          43                           139   52    69    122   148   43    97    28   91    34    45    80    97    28
  Game 25    79                           270                          31    318   63    286   175   175   109   32   102   38    51    90    109   32
  Game 26    246                          72                           232   87    116   203   246   72    189   55   178   66    89    155   189   55
  Game 27    61                           210                          24    247   49    222   135   135   148   43   131   61    131   61    157   34
  Game 28    142                          42                           134   50    67    117   142   42    158   46   140   65    140   65    168   37
  Game 29    229                          67                           215   80    107   188   229   67    161   47   142   66    142   66    171   38
  Game 30    48                           166                          19    195   39    175   107   107   153   45   144   54    72    126   153   45
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 31    54                           183                          21    216   43    194   118   118   164   48   145   67    145   67    174   38
  Game 32    203                          59                           191   71    95    167   203   59    182   53   171   64    85    150   182   53
  Game 33    72                           245                          28    288   57    259   158   158   109   32   96    45    96    45    116   25
  Game 34    52                           179                          21    210   42    189   116   116   170   50   150   70    150   70    180   40
  Game 35    170                          50                           160   60    80    140   170   50    128   37   120   45    60    105   128   37
  Game 36    151                          44                           142   53    71    124   151   44    166   48   156   58    78    136   166   48
  Game 37    171                          50                           161   60    80    141   171   50    220   64   207   77    103   181   220   64
  Game 38    61                           209                          24    246   49    222   135   135   164   48   145   67    145   67    174   38
  Game 39    44                           150                          17    176   35    158   97    97    72    21   64    29    64    29    77    17
  Game 40    146                          43                           137   51    68    120   146   43    92    27   86    32    43    75    92    27
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 41    240                          70                           225   84    112   197   240   70    144   42   135   50    67    118   144   42
  Game 42    74                           252                          29    296   59    267   163   163   240   70   212   99    212   99    255   56
  Game 43    240                          70                           226   85    113   198   240   70    38    11   33    15    33    15    40    8
  Game 44    122                          35                           114   43    57    100   122   35    189   55   167   78    167   78    201   44
  Game 45    47                           161                          18    189   37    170   104   104   145   42   137   51    68    119   145   42
  Game 46    41                           140                          16    165   33    149   91    91    151   44   133   62    133   62    160   35
  Game 47    203                          59                           191   71    95    167   203   59    190   56   179   67    89    156   190   56
  Game 48    52                           180                          21    211   42    190   116   116   146   43   137   51    68    120   146   43
  Game 49    61                           209                          24    246   49    221   135   135   182   53   160   75    160   75    193   42
  Game 50    180                          53                           169   63    84    148   180   53    216   63   203   76    101   178   216   63
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 51    198                          58                           187   70    93    163   198   58    239   70   211   98    211   98    253   56
  Game 52    196                          57                           185   69    92    162   196   57    115   34   109   40    54    95    115   34
  Game 53    284                          83                           268   100   134   234   284   83    142   41   134   50    67    117   142   41
  Game 54    44                           152                          17    179   35    161   98    98    90    26   84    31    42    74    90    26
  Game 55    34                           117                          13    138   27    124   75    75    152   44   134   62    134   62    161   35
  Game 56    26                           91                           10    107   21    97    59    59    156   46   138   64    138   64    165   36
  Game 57    57                           196                          23    231   46    208   127   127   210   61   185   86    185   86    222   49
  Game 58    121                          35                           113   42    56    99    121   35    238   70   210   98    210   98    252   56
  Game 59    187                          55                           176   66    88    154   187   55    180   53   170   63    85    148   180   53
  Game 60    54                           184                          21    217   43    195   119   119   82    24   77    29    38    67    82    24
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 61    61                           209                          24    245   49    221   135   135   177   52   156   73    156   73    188   41
  Game 62    35                           121                          14    142   28    128   78    78    141   41   133   49    66    116   141   41
  Game 63    21                           73                           8     87    17    78    47    47    235   69   221   83    110   194   235   69
  Game 64    208                          61                           196   73    98    171   208   61    278   82   246   114   246   114   295   65
  Game 65    163                          47                           153   57    76    134   163   47    235   69   221   83    110   193   235   69
  Game 66    42                           143                          16    168   33    151   92    92    204   60   180   84    180   84    216   48
  Game 67    31                           107                          12    126   25    114   69    69    201   59   178   83    178   83    213   47
  Game 68    258                          75                           243   91    121   212   258   75    159   46   150   56    75    131   159   46
  Game 69    163                          48                           153   57    76    134   163   48    163   48   153   57    76    134   163   48
  Game 70    125                          37                           118   44    59    103   125   37    161   47   142   66    142   66    170   37
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 71    47                           162                          19    191   38    171   105   105   177   52   167   62    83    146   177   52
  Game 72    147                          43                           138   52    69    121   147   43    169   49   159   59    79    139   169   49
  Game 73    18                           64                           7     75    15    67    41    41    59    17   52    24    52    24    63    14
  Game 74    145                          42                           136   51    68    119   145   42    185   54   163   76    163   76    196   43
  Game 75    38                           130                          15    153   30    138   84    84    108   31   102   38    51    89    108   31
  Game 76    132                          39                           124   46    62    109   132   39    218   64   205   77    102   180   218   64
  Game 77    79                           271                          31    319   63    287   175   175   168   49   148   69    148   69    178   39
  Game 78    118                          34                           111   41    55    97    118   34    128   37   112   52    112   52    135   30
  Game 79    123                          36                           116   43    58    101   123   36    187   55   165   77    165   77    198   44
  Game 80    44                           152                          17    178   35    161   98    98    225   66   212   79    106   186   225   66
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 81    54                           186                          21    219   43    197   120   120   121   35   107   50    107   50    128   28
  Game 82    125                          36                           117   44    58    103   125   36    269   79   237   110   237   110   284   63
  Game 83    232                          68                           218   82    109   191   232   68    237   69   209   97    209   97    251   55
  Game 84    61                           210                          24    247   49    223   136   136   196   57   185   69    92    162   196   57
  Game 85    41                           140                          16    165   33    148   90    90    55    16   52    19    26    45    55    16
  Game 86    29                           100                          11    118   23    106   65    65    202   59   190   71    95    166   202   59
  Game 87    155                          45                           146   54    73    128   155   45    125   36   118   44    59    103   125   36
  Game 88    131                          38                           123   46    61    107   131   38    121   35   114   42    57    100   121   35
  Game 89    58                           198                          23    233   46    210   128   128   187   55   165   77    165   77    198   44
  Game 90    315                          92                           296   111   148   259   315   92    256   75   226   105   226   105   271   60
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 91    200                          58                           188   70    94    165   200   58    228   67   215   80    107   188   228   67
  Game 92    220                          64                           207   77    103   181   220   64    135   39   119   55    119   55    143   31
  Game 93    43                           146                          17    172   34    155   95    95    155   45   146   54    73    128   155   45
  Game 94    161                          47                           152   57    76    133   161   47    116   34   109   40    54    95    116   34
  Game 95    186                          54                           175   65    87    153   186   54    270   79   238   111   238   111   286   63
  Game 96    30                           104                          12    123   24    111   67    67    151   44   142   53    71    125   151   44
  Game 97    55                           189                          22    222   44    200   122   122   148   43   140   52    70    122   148   43
  Game 98    218                          64                           205   77    102   179   218   64    195   57   172   80    172   80    206   45
  Game 99    51                           174                          20    205   41    184   113   113   193   56   170   79    170   79    204   45
  Game 100   62                           211                          24    249   49    224   137   137   196   57   173   80    173   80    208   46
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 101   202                          59                           190   71    95    166   202   59    145   42   136   51    68    119   145   42
  Game 102   67                           230                          27    271   54    244   149   149   156   45   137   64    137   64    165   36
  Game 103   62                           212                          25    250   50    225   137   137   169   49   149   69    149   69    179   39
  Game 104   195                          57                           183   68    91    160   195   57    123   36   108   50    108   50    130   28
  Game 105   266                          78                           250   94    125   219   266   78    129   38   121   45    60    106   129   38
  Game 106   64                           218                          25    257   51    231   141   141   123   36   116   43    58    101   123   36
  Game 107   103                          30                           97    36    48    85    103   30    218   64   192   89    192   89    230   51
  Game 108   45                           154                          18    181   36    163   100   100   152   44   134   62    134   62    161   35
  Game 109   40                           137                          16    162   32    145   89    89    228   67   215   80    107   188   228   67
  Game 110   111                          32                           104   39    52    91    111   32    227   66   214   80    107   187   227   66
                                                                                                                                                    
  Game 111   44                           150                          17    177   35    159   97    97    159   46   150   56    75    131   159   46
  Game 112   47                           159                          18    188   37    169   103   103   189   55   167   78    167   78    201   44
  Game 113   29                           101                          11    119   23    107   65    65    183   54   172   64    86    151   183   54
  Game 114   135                          39                           127   47    63    111   135   39    59    17   56    21    28    49    59    17
  Game 115   143                          42                           135   50    67    118   143   42    208   61   184   85    184   85    221   49
  Game 116   44                           151                          17    178   35    160   98    98    160   47   141   66    141   66    170   37
  Game 117   207                          61                           195   73    97    171   207   61    146   43   129   60    129   60    155   34
  Game 118   32                           109                          12    129   25    116   70    70    204   60   180   84    180   84    216   48
  Game 119   195                          57                           183   68    91    160   195   57    138   40   130   48    65    113   138   40
  Game 120   110                          32                           104   39    52    91    110   32    199   58   188   70    94    164   199   58

where *C~ij~*(*t*) indicates the number of times that strategy *j* has been chosen in the first *t* rounds, *x* is the obtained payoff, and *N*(1) a parameter of the model determining the weight of the initial attractions.

### Stochastic choice rule

Player *i*'s choice probabilities are calculated as follows:
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where λ is a sensitivity parameter, whereas *S*(*t*) gives a measure of payoff variability.

### Initial attractions

*S*(1) is defined as the expected absolute distance between the payoff from random choices and the expected payoff given random choices, denoted as *A*(1). At period *t* \> 1:
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where *x* is the received payoff, *m* the number of player *i*'s pure strategies, and *A*(*t* + 1) is:

S

t

\+

1

=

A

t

⋅

t

\+

m

⋅

N

1

\+

x

t

\+

m

⋅

N

1

\+

1

.

Initial attractions are such that *a~ij~*(1) = *A*(1), for all *i* and *j*. This model has two free parameters, namely λ and *N*(1).

The RL model (Erev and Roth, [@B11]; Erev et al., [@B13])
---------------------------------------------------------

### Initial propensities

Initial propensities are set equal to the expected payoff from random choice \[denoted by *A*(1)\], so that *a~ij~*(1) = *A*(1), for all *i* and *j*.

### Attractions updating

Propensities are updated as follows:
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where *v~ij~*(*t*) is the realized payoff, and *w* parameter expressing the weight of past experience. The updating rule above implies agents' insensitivity to foregone payoffs.

### Stochastic choice rule

Choice probabilities are calculated as follows:

p

i

k

t

=

exp

λ

⋅

a

i

k

t

∑

j

exp

λ

⋅

a

i

j

t

,

where λ is a payoff sensitivity parameter.

The NRL model (Erev et al., [@B13])
-----------------------------------

### Initial propensities

Initial propensities are set equal to the expected payoff from random choice \[denoted by *A*(1)\], so that *a~ij~*(1) = *A*(1), for all *i* and *j*.

### Attractions updating

Propensities are updated according to the following:
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where *v~ij~*(*t*) is the realized payoff and *w* a weight parameter. The updating rule implies agents' insensitivity to foregone payoffs.

### Stochastic choice rule

Choice probabilities are defined as:
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where *S*(*t*) gives a measure of payoff variability and λ is payoff sensitivity parameter.
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where recent*~i~* is the most recent experienced payoff from action *i* = 1, 2. At the first period, recent*~i~* = *A*(1), and *S*(1) is set equal to λ. Similarly to the NFP model, payoff sensitivity \[the ratio λ/*S*(*t*)\] is assumed to decrease with payoff variability.

The NFP model (Erev et al., [@B13]; Ert and Erev, [@B14])
---------------------------------------------------------

### Initial propensities

Initial propensities are set equal to the expected payoff from random choice \[denoted by *A*(1)\], so that *a~ij~*(1) = *A*(1), for all *i* and *j*.

### Attractions updating

Propensities are updated according to the following:

a*~ij~*(*t* + 1) = (1 − *w*)·*a~ij~*(*t*) + *w*·*v~ij~*(*t*), for all *i* and *j*,

where *v~ij~*(*t*) is the expected payoff in the selected cell and *w* is a parameter that measures sensitivity to foregone payoffs.

### Stochastic choice rule

Choice probabilities are obtained as follows:
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where *S*(*t*) gives a measure of payoff variability, and λ is payoff sensitivity parameter.

S

t

\+

1

=

1

\-

w

⋅

S

t

\+

w

max

recen

t

1

,

recen

t

2

\-

v

i

j

t

,

where *recent~i~* is the last experienced payoff from action *i* = 1, 2. At the first period, recent*~i~* = *A*(1), and *S*(1) is set equal to λ.

The SFP model (Erev et al., [@B13])
-----------------------------------

### Initial propensities

Initial propensities are set equal to the expected payoff from random choice \[denoted by *A*(1)\], so that *a~ij~*(1) = *A*(1), for all *i* and *j*.

### Attractions updating

Propensities are updated according to the following:

*a~ij~*(*t* + 1) = (1 − *w*)·*a~ij~*(*t*) + *w*·*v~ij~*(*t*), for all *i* and *j*,

where *v~ij~*(*t*) is the expected payoff in the selected cell and, *w* is a parameter that measures sensitivity to foregone payoffs.

### Stochastic choice rule

Choice probabilities are calculated as follows:
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where λ is a payoff sensitivity parameter.

The stEWA model (Camerer and Ho, [@B2]; Ho et al., [@B20])
----------------------------------------------------------

### Attractions updating

At time *t*, player *i* associates to his *j*-th pure strategy the attraction *a~ij~*(*t*), given by:
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where *s~i~*(*t*) and *s~−i~*(*t*) are the strategies played by player *i* and his opponents, respectively, and π*~i~*(*s~ij~*,*s~−i~*(*t*)) is the ex-post payoff deriving from playing strategy *j*, and *I*(·) is the Kronecker function. Functions δ*~ij~*(*t*) and Φ*~i~*(*t*) are called, respectively, *attention function* and *change detector function*. The latter depends primarily on the difference between the relative frequencies of chosen strategies in the most recent periods and the relative frequencies calculated on the entire series of actions. The attention function essentially determines the importance that players give to past experience.

### Stochastic choice rule

Choice probabilities are calculated as follows:
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where λ is the unique free parameter of the model.

### Initial attractions

Authors suggest at least four ways of setting initial attractions *a~ij~*(0). In our implementation, initial attractions are set equal to the average payoff from random choice, leading to first period uniformly distributed choices.
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